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Abstract
Objective To examine the reasons why practices exempt patients from
the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme
(exception reporting) and to identify the characteristics of general
practices associated with informed dissent.
Design Retrospective analysis.
Setting Data for 2008-9 extracted from the clinical computing systems
of general practices in England.
Participants 8229 English family practices.
Main outcome measures Rates of exception reporting for 37 clinical
quality indicators, associations of patient and general practice factors
with exception rates, and financial gain for practices relating to their use
of exception reporting.
Results The median rate of exception reporting was 2.7% (interquartile
range 1.9-3.9%) overall and 0.44% (0.14-1.1%) for informed dissent,
but variation in rates was wide between practices and across indicators.
Common reasons for exception reporting were logistical (40.6% of
exceptions), clinical contraindication (18.7%), and patient informed
dissent (30.1%). Higher rates of informed dissent were associated with:
higher numbers of registered patients, higher levels of local area
deprivation, and failure of the practice to secure maximum remuneration
in the previous year. Exception reporting increased the cost of the
scheme by £30 844 500 (€36 877 700; $49 053 200) (£0.58 per patient),
with two indicators accounting for a quarter of this additional cost.
Conclusions The provision to exception report enables practices to
exempt dissenting patients without being financially penalised. Relatively
few patients were excluded for informed dissent, however, suggesting
that the incentivised activities were broadly acceptable to patients.
Introduction
Since early 2000 payers across healthcare systems worldwide
have experimented with pay for performance schemes that
explicitly link doctors’ remuneration to quality of care, with
mixed success.1-3 In the United Kingdom, a national scheme for
primary care—the Quality and Outcomes Framework—was
introduced in 2004, providing financial incentives to family
practices for meeting targets on a range of clinical,
organisational, and patient experience indicators.4Most practices
have performed well under the scheme,5-8 but improved patient
outcomes have not been consistently evident.9-11 Even if they
successfully stimulate improved performance, pay for
performance schemes have several potential unintended
consequences. In particular, given a method of remuneration
that financially rewards doctors for performing procedures,
prescribing drugs, and controlling biological variables, patients
may be coerced or refused care if they are non-compliant.12 13
Understanding these potential risks, the designers of the Quality
Outcomes Framework included two mechanisms intended to
protect patients from coercive care. Firstly, upper payment
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thresholds are set below 100%, so practices do not have to
achieve the targets for all patients to receive the maximum
payment. Secondly, doctors are permitted to use their clinical
judgment to remove inappropriate patients from achievement
calculations for clinical indicators, a process known as exception
reporting. The box gives permitted reasons for exception
reporting, including logistical considerations (for example,
recent registration of the patient with the practice), clinical
reasons (for example, a contraindication to treatment), and
patient informed dissent (that is, not agreeing to the investigation
or treatment). Patients recently registered with the practice or
with a recent diagnosis are automatically excepted by clinical
computing systems, whereas practices must actively identify
patients who meet other exception reporting criteria. The
provision to except dissenting patients is intended to counter
any financial conflict of interest for doctors in respecting a
patient’s choice to refuse an intervention incentivised under the
scheme.
The principal drawback of exception reporting is that it allows
practices to receive the maximum remuneration without
necessarily providing the required care for all eligible patients.14
If exception rules are applied too readily or inappropriately,
high achievement scores will mask suboptimal care.4 15 To date,
overall exception reporting rates have generally been low (less
than 6%),16with little evidence of widespread fraud.17However,
a few practices have achieved high scores by excluding
unusually large numbers of patients.18 19 Concerns over
inappropriate use of exception reporting have led to calls for
the provision to be amended.20 Without the ability to exception
report, practices could be penalised for respecting the wishes
of dissenting patients, particularly in localities where rates of
dissent are high. Recent qualitative work suggests that doctors
perceive exception reporting to be an important, defensible
safeguard against inappropriate or over treatment of patients.21
However, to date no research has been carried out into the
reasons why practices exception report patients and in particular
how high rates of patient dissent are for different population
groups. We examined the reasons given by practices for
exception reporting patients and identified patient and practice
characteristics associated with informed dissent.
In 2008-9 the Quality and Outcomes Framework consisted of
127 quality indicators, of which 65 covered the maintenance of
disease registers, organisational activities, and patient experience
of care. The remaining 62 indicators covered clinical activities
across 15 clinical areas, for which practices are permitted to
exception report patients for specified reasons (box). Practices
are expected to satisfy certain criteria before exception reporting
patients. For exceptions due to informed dissent, practices are
required to make personal contact with the patient and to record
the patient’s reasons for rejecting the intervention in the notes.
Practices are awarded points based on the proportion of
appropriate patients (that is, those not exception reported) for
whom targets are achieved, between a lower achievement
threshold of 40% and an upper threshold that varies by indicator
(table 1⇓). The maximum number of points awarded also varies
by indicator. In 2008-9 each point earned practices £126,
adjusted for the relative prevalence of the disease and the size
of the practice population. Practice performance is monitored
by primary care trusts, which have the power to audit patient
records and to investigate the use and misuse of exception
reporting.
Methods
We carried out a retrospective study of exception reporting by
English general practices in 2008-9, identifying practice and
population predictors of exception reporting rates through
multilevel multivariate linear regression.
Data sources
We used data from the Quality Management and Analysis
System (QMAS), the national information system supporting
theQuality andOutcomes Framework, published by theNational
Health Service Information Centre. The Quality Management
and Analysis System holds publicly available data on the
achievement of indicators for 8229 English practices (over
99.9% of all practices). Detailed information on exception
reporting (including reason for exception) is not publicly
reported and we specifically acquired the relevant dataset for
this study. Data on patient and practice characteristics were
obtained from the Office for National Statistics website22 and
the General Medical Services database. Practices were grouped
into fourths on the basis of the local level of area deprivation,
using boundary datasets from the UKBORDERS website23 to
assign index of deprivation scores to practices at the postcode
level.
Data analyses
For each practice and each clinical indicator we calculated the
rate of exception reporting as the number of excepted patients
divided by the number of eligible patients:
ERi=Ei/(Ei+Di)
Where Ei is the number of patients exception reported for that
indicator and Di is the number of patients meeting the criteria
for the indicator and not excepted by the practice. As the
distributions of exception reporting rates are skewed, we report
medians. We calculated the overall rates for a practice (that is,
exception rates across multiple indicators) by summing
exceptions for all indicators and dividing by the sum of eligible
patients. Patients eligible for multiple indicators are double
counted in the overall rates, and these rates therefore represent
the proportion of “opportunities” to perform the incentivised
activity that resulted in an exception report, rather than the
proportion of patients excepted.
We calculated exception reporting rates separately for each of
the main reasons: logistical, clinical (contraindication or
intolerance), clinical (patient unsuitable), and informed dissent.
Under the Quality Management and Analysis System, if the
indicator is met the patient is counted in Di and not in Ei, even
if the patient was previously exception reported—that is, the
patient is not counted as having been exception reported. In
addition, the Quality Management and Analysis System only
records one exception reporting reason for each patient. For
patients who satisfy two or more criteria, the first criterion
encountered in the business rules is recorded (see appendix on
bmj.com).
We also estimated the average financial gain (Gi) from exception
reporting, following a previously published method.16 For each
indicator in each practice this is calculated as the difference
between the estimated remuneration received and the
remuneration that would have been received had the practice
not excepted any patients (see appendix on bmj.com).
Because patterns of exception reporting differ according to the
type of activity,16 we classified indicators into three categories:
measurement (for example, monitoring blood pressure levels),
treatment (for example, prescribing β blockers), and outcomes
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Reasons practice staff may use to exempt patients from quality assessment*
Logistical
The patient has recently received a diagnosis or recently registered with the practice†
A specified investigative service is unavailable to the practice
Clinical—contraindication or intolerance
The patient has had an allergic or other adverse reaction to a specified drug or has another contraindication to the drug
The patient has not tolerated the drug
The patient is taking the maximal tolerated dose of a drug, but the levels remain suboptimal
Clinical—patient unsuitable
The indicator is judged inappropriate for the patient because of particular circumstances, such as terminal illness or extreme frailty‡
The patient has a supervening condition that makes the specified treatment clinically inappropriate
The patient has received at least three invitations for a review during the preceding 12 months but has not attended
Informed dissent
The patient refuses to be reviewed‡
The patient does not agree to a specific investigation or treatment§
*Not all reasons are available for every indicator—for example, there is no “contraindication” option for indicators relating
to measuring biological variables
†The definition of “recent” is three months in the case of measurement indicators (for example, measurement of blood
pressure) and nine months in the case of treatment and outcomes indicators (for example, control of blood pressure within
target levels)
‡Patient is excluded for the whole clinical domain (for example, all diabetes indicators)
§Patient is excluded for this activity across all clinical domains (for example, measurement of blood pressure)
(for example, controlling blood pressure levels). For 25
indicators (see supplementary table on bmj.com), including all
treatment indicators, the Quality Management and Analysis
System does not differentiate between patient refusal of
treatment and clinical contraindications, rendering some
exceptions non-ascribable. These indicators were excluded from
all analyses relating to reasons for exception reporting.
Exception reporting rates were analysed for the remaining 37
indicators (table 1), by category and by reason for exclusion.
Sensitivity analyses based on the excluded indicators are given
in the appendix on bmj.com.
We used twomultilevel mixed effects multiple linear regression
models to identify indicator, practice, and population
characteristics as predictors of overall and of patient informed
dissent exception reporting rates. The structure of the data was
three level, with indicators crossed with practices and nested
within primary care trusts. To account for this structure and to
model variability at each level, we used mixed effects models
with the xtmixed command in Stata. Owing to computational
limitations, models of indicator variability (both fixed and
random effects) failed to converge, hence we used a three level
model with indicator observations nested within practices and
practices nested within primary care trusts. We assessed
collinearity by estimating variance-inflation factors for the
independent variables. All factors were in the range 1.0 to 2.1,
below the conservative threshold for collinearity. All statistical
comparisons were made at an α level of 5%. Stata v11.1
software was used for all analyses.
Results
Rates of exception reporting
In 2008-9 the median exception reporting rate across all 62
clinical indicators was 4.5% (interquartile range 3.4-5.8%).
Median rates for individual indicators ranged from 0.0% (for
seven indicators) to 24.4% (CHD 10: β blocker therapy for
patients with coronary heart disease) (table 1). Rates were
generally lower for measurement indicators (median 2.4%) than
for treatment and intermediate outcomes indicators (median
10.0% and 5.7%, respectively).
The median exception rate across the 37 indicators for which
reasons for exception reporting were ascribable was 2.7%
(interquartile range 1.9-3.9%). Figure 1⇓ gives the proportions
of patients excepted for each indicator. Logistical exceptions
were used most frequently (40.6% of exceptions) and clinical
contraindications least frequently (7.6% of exceptions, table
2⇓). Logistical exceptions were particularly common for
indicators involving referrals to other agencies or complex
assessments for patients with a new diagnosis—for example,
diagnosis of atrial fibrillation confirmed by specialist assessment
(AF 4), assessment of the severity of depression (DEP 2), and
confirmation of stroke by further investigation (STR 13).
Informed dissent accounted for 37.4% of measurement
exceptions, 21.9% of intermediate outcomes exceptions, and
30.1% of exceptions overall. The median exception rate for
informed dissent across all 37 indicators was 0.44%
(interquartile range 0.14-1.1%), but a minority of practices had
considerably higher rates: 10% of practices excepted over 2.2%
of patients for informed dissent and 1% of practices excepted
over 5.7%. Median rates for individual indicators ranged from
0.0% (25 of the 37 indicators) to 1.2% (DM 20: patients with
diabetes with HbA1C levels ≤7.5%, table 1).
The estimated median rate of informed dissent across the 25
indicators excluded from the main analysis was between 0.73%
(assuming no non-ascribable exceptions were due to informed
dissent) and 4.8% (assuming all non-ascribable exceptions were
due to informed dissent, see appendix on bmj.com). Based on
these assumptions, the overall median rate of informed dissent
for all 62 clinical indicators was between 0.53% (interquartile
range 0.18-1.3%) and 1.7% (1.2-2.5%).
Factors associated with exception reporting
Table 3⇓ gives the results of the regression analyses for the 37
indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were
ascribable. Higher overall exception reporting rates were
associated with lower payment thresholds, higher points values
(maximum remuneration), and lower numbers of eligible
patients. After controlling for other factors, exception reporting
rates did not differ significantly between intermediate outcomes
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and measurement indicators. The generally low rates of
exception reporting previously noted for measurement indicators
may therefore be attributable to characteristics such as their
generally high upper payment thresholds and low points values.
Rates of exception reporting varied with practice characteristics:
higher rates were associated with younger age profiles of
doctors, failure to secure maximum remuneration on that
indicator in the previous year, and a higher number of registered
patients. Higher rates were also associated with patient and local
area characteristics—for example, higher levels of local area
deprivation. Most of these effects were small. The most
influential factor was previous performance on the pay for
performance scheme: practices that failed to acquire all available
points for a specific indicator in the previous year (2007-8) had,
on average, exception reporting rates 2.3% higher than those
that succeeded. With respect to area deprivation, median
exception reporting rates across the 37 indicators varied from
2.6% (interquartile range 1.6-3.7%) for practices in the most
affluent fourth to 2.9% (2.0-4.2%) for practices in the most
deprived fourth.
Factors associated with higher levels of informed dissent
exceptions were broadly comparable with those for overall
exceptions, but effect sizes tended to be smaller and were
non-significant in some cases. With respect to area deprivation,
median exception reporting rates for informed dissent varied
from 0.42% (0.15-1.0%) for practices in the most affluent fourth
to 0.45% (0.14-1.3%) for practices in the most deprived fourth.
Financial gain associated with exception
reporting
By removing patients from the denominator for achievement
calculations, exception reporting increased a practice’s reported
achievement rate. If a practice’s achievement rate before
exception reporting was below the upper payment threshold,
then exception reporting would also increase remuneration.
Figure 2⇓ shows the remuneration practices received for each
of the 62 clinical indicators attributable to achieving the clinical
targets and to exception reporting. For most indicators the cost
of exception reporting was relatively low, as most practices
exceeded the upper payment thresholds even before exception
reporting was taken into account.
Indicators ordered by remuneration
attributable to exception reporting
Overall, 5.4% of clinical points scored by practices—and
therefore remuneration received—was attributable to exception
reporting. This equates to about £30 844 500 (€36 877 700; $49
053 200) for all English practices, £3834 for the average
practice, and £0.58 per patient. Mean gain ranged from £3586
per practice in the most affluent fourth to £4093 in the most
deprived fourth. The cost of exception reporting varied widely
by indicator, from £1630 for DM 11 (recording the blood
pressure of patients with diabetes) to £4.5m for DEP 2 (assessing
the severity of depression). Just two of the 62 indicators, DEP
2 andMH 9 (reviewing physical and social care for people with
psychotic illness), accounted for £8.4m—over a quarter of the
total cost associated with exception reporting.
For the 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting
were ascribable, 4.9% of remuneration received was attributable
to exception reporting (£19 188 917 for all English practices,
£2386 for the average practice, and £0.36 per patient). Out of
this total, the gain attributable to informed dissent exceptions
was £2 406 500 nationally, £300 per practice and £0.05 per
patient. Mean gain ranged from £244 per practice in the most
affluent fourth to £351 in the most deprived fourth. The cost of
informed dissent exceptions was relatively low because most
applied to measurement indicators, which attract less
remuneration.
Discussion
Respecting a patient’s decision to refuse an investigation or
treatment, even if the decision is considered wrong or irrational
by the attending clinician, is central to medical professionalism24
and a legal requirement in most circumstances. By making
incomes partly dependent on patient compliance, pay for
performance schemes bring a clinician’s financial self interest
into conflict with their duty not to pressure patients to accept
medical advice. This can have unintended consequences—for
example, under California’s primary care pay for performance
scheme, some practices forced the disenrollment of
non-compliant patients,13 and in a national survey, US primary
care physicians identified performance measures as a driver of
more aggressive practice.25Under the UKQuality andOutcomes
Framework, dissenting patients are removed from payment
calculations, making the quality targets fairer for practitioners
and providing some protection from coercion for patients.21Our
paper suggests that rates of informed dissent in the UK scheme
are low, with little variation in rates across the spectrum of
deprivation.
Strengths and limitations of the study
This is the first study to examine the reasons used by practices
for exception reporting patients under the Quality and Outcomes
Framework, and in particular the use of the informed dissent
criterion. The study is subject to several limitations. Firstly,
practices might not record all expressions of informed dissent
for several reasons—for example, if the practice has exceeded
the upper payment threshold for the year or if another exception
reporting criterion applies for a given patient. In the absence of
other permissible reasons for excluding patients, rates of
informed dissent would possibly be higher than we report.
Secondly, the central QualityManagement and Analysis System
database only records the first exception reporting reason
encountered in the business rule algorithm for each indicator
(see appendix on bmj.com). Our figures will therefore
underestimate the true extent of informed dissent for indicators
where dissent codes appear later in the algorithm. Finally, we
were unable to analyse in detail the reasons for exclusion for
25 indicators. Rates of informed dissent may be higher for these
indicators (see appendix on bmj.com), but precise figures can
only be determined by auditing individual practices.
Patterns of exception reporting
As with previous studies,16 26 we found that overall rates of
exception reporting were generally low but varied widely by
indicator. Examining the reasons used to exception report
patients provides additional insights. For example, the unusually
high number of exceptions for certain measurement indicators
(such as confirmation of stroke diagnosis) were mainly
logistical, pointing to potential problemswith access to specialist
services and the timescales allocated to these quality indicators.
Even greater variation existed between indicators in the costs
associated with exception reporting: over £8m (27% of the total
cost) was attached to just two indicators (reviewing patients
with psychotic illness and assessing the severity of depression).
It is notable that the latter indicator proved unworkable for many
doctors and was recommended for removal from the scheme
by the Quality and Outcomes Framework advisory committee
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of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in
2011.27
Lower exception reporting rates were associated with indicators
for which upper payment thresholds were high. These thresholds
were intended to represent what is maximally attainable by the
average practice, and they therefore reflect the anticipated level
of difficulty of indicators. Fewer patients were therefore
excepted for indicators perceived to be less challenging to
achieve—for example, most measurement indicators. Some
practice characteristics, such as list size, were also associated
with exception reporting rates, despite having no direct bearing
on patient eligibility for exception reporting. Fraudulent or
inappropriate activity is one possible explanation for these
relations, particularly given that practices that fail to achieve
maximum remuneration in one year except more patients the
following year, a finding noted in previous years of the scheme.19
Although monitoring of exception reporting by primary care
trusts may have discouraged gross misuse and driven exception
reporting rates down, the frequency and thoroughness of
monitoring varies across trusts,28 and low level misuse may have
gone undetected. However, it is also possible that propensity to
legitimately except patients or thoroughness in documenting
exceptions is related to certain practice characteristics. For
example, larger practices tend to be better organised29 and may
therefore be better at identifying patients who should be
excepted. Conversely, practices with larger disease registers for
a given list size may have detectedmore patients with less severe
disease, who may be less likely to meet exception reporting
criteria. Nevertheless, our findings raise the possibility of
gaming, and as financial incentive schemes rely on accurate and
honest reporting of performance this issue warrants further and
more direct investigation than we have provided in this paper.
Characteristics of patients attending practices were also
associated with exception reporting rates. Practices located in
more deprived areas tended to except more patients, both overall
and for reasons of informed dissent. Given that patients excepted
for informed dissent are effectively drawn from a subset of
patients not excepted for other reasons, it is possible that the
relation between deprivation and informed dissent would be
stronger in the absence of other reasons for exception reporting.
There has been concern that high levels of exception reporting
in practices serving deprived populations may be disguising
unmet need.26 Our findings suggest that the differences in
exception reporting rates attributable to deprivation, although
significant, are small. This could therefore be seen in a more
positive light as doctors in more deprived areas, where health
literacy is likely to be more limited, seem to be listening to and
responding appropriately to patients’ concerns about incentivised
procedures. This potential explanation resonates with the views
of family doctors,21 but further qualitative work is needed to
explore these hypotheses in more detail. In contrast, financial
“gains” from exception reporting varied substantially with
deprivation. Practices in more deprived areas tended to have
lower achievement rates for the clinical indicators and so were
more likely to achieve below the upper payment thresholds and
therefore to benefit financially from excepting patients.
Conclusions and policy implications
Under the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework variations in
exception reporting rates and associated costs are wide, both
between practices and across indicators, which require further
investigation and careful monitoring. The high exception rates
for certain quality indicators also raise questions for policy
makers about the appropriateness of these indicators andwhether
the current exception reporting system is being used
appropriately to deal with the potential unintended consequences
of financial incentives.
Exception reporting does, however, provide some protection
from inappropriate and coercive treatment of patients whose
providers are subject to financial incentives. Relatively few
patients are excepted for reasons of informed dissent in the
United Kingdom, which suggests that activities incentivised in
the scheme are broadly acceptable to patients (although this
does not imply approval of the incentive scheme itself). It could
be argued that dissent is so uncommon that a specific exception
reporting provision is not required, as long as upper thresholds
are set below 100%. However, removing the provision might
subject a substantial minority of patients attending practices
performing below the upper payment thresholds to coercion.
Thousands of patients expressed their wish not to receive
interventions under the framework (for example, over 100 000
patients with asthma actively declined a review). At relatively
low cost, the provision to exception report enables patients’
voices to be heard and counters some of the critiques of the
scheme as endangering the doctor-patient relationship.30
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Tables
Table 1| Quality and Outcomes Framework clinical indicators included in main analysis (n=37)
Median exception rate
(interquartile range) (%)% exceptedNo of exceptionsMaximum
points
available
Upper
payment
threshold
Indicator
typeDescription
Indicator (No of
eligible patients) Total
Informed
dissentTotal
Informed
dissentTotal
Informed
dissent
Atrial fibrillation:
10.0 (0.0-20.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)13.70.112 2001031090MeasureNewly diagnosed with
record of ECG or specialist
confirmed diagnosis
AF 4 (89 230)
Asthma:
0.0 (0.0-1.6)0.0 (0.0-0.0)2.52.167315489680MeasureRecord of smoking status
(ages 14-19)
AST 3 (266 871)
2.0 (0.9-5.0)0.2 (0.0-2.1)5.13.3161 486106 7342070MeasureAsthma reviewAST 6 (3 191 842)
6.7 (2.3-12.3)0.0 (0.0-0.0)8.31.124 29933081580MeasureMeasures of variability or
reversibility (new
diagnoses, age ≥8)
AST 8 (292 139)
Hypertension:
0.5 (0.2-1.2)0.1 (0.0-0.6)1.00.672 80344 3262090MeasureRecord of blood pressureBP 4 (7 120 728)
3.4 (2.3-5.1)0.3 (0.0-0.9)4.00.9288 09262 4275770OutcomeBlood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
BP 5 (7 119 579)
Cancer:
0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)1.40.21963302690MeasurePatient review within six
months of diagnosis
CAN 3 (137 921)
Coronary heart
disease:
0.6 (0.0-1.5)0.0 (0.0-0.6)1.00.519 5469433790MeasureRecord of blood pressureCHD 5 (1 883 107)
2.4 (1.2-4.0)0.0 (0.0-1.0)2.90.855 39415 0561970OutcomeBlood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
CHD 6 (1 882 959)
1.9 (0.8-3.5)0.0 (0.0-1.0)2.60.949 73416 746790MeasureRecord of total cholesterolCHD 7 (1 882 998)
Heart failure:
4.5 (0.0-12.5)0.0 (0.0-0.0)8.21.096781164690MeasureDiagnosis confirmed by
electrocardiogram or by
specialist
HF 2 (117 872)
Chronic kidney
disease:
0.0 (0.0-0.5)0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.50.178551720690MeasureRecord of blood pressureCKD 2 (1 736 280)
6.2 (2.9-11.3)0.0 (0.0-0.3)8.10.4140 25461371170OutcomeBlood pressure ≤140/85
mm Hg
CKD 3 (1 736 709)
Dementia:
5.3 (0.0-11.1)0.0 (0.0-0.0)7.60.317 7177501560MeasureCare has been reviewedDEM 2 (232 047)
Depression:
1.8 (1.1-3.0)0.0 (0.0-0.1)2.70.697 00122 044890MeasureCase finding for patients
with diabetes or coronary
heart disease
DEP 1 (3 656 353)
10.5 (3.4-20.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)12.80.257 7897172590MeasureAssessment of severity at
outset of treatment
DEP 2 (452 152)
Diabetes:
2.2 (1.0-4.2)0.6 (0.0-1.9)3.11.568 27132 539390MeasureRecord of body mass indexDM 2 (2 208 812)
2.2 (1.1-3.7)0.5 (0.0-1.5)2.71.160 68224 405390MeasureRecord of HbA1c or
equivalent
DM 5 (2 208 753)
4.4 (2.8-6.8)0.8 (0.0-2.1)5.11.6112 29934 5061190OutcomeHbA1C ≤10%DM 7 (2 208 395)
1.0 (0.3-2.0)0.3 (0.0-1.2)1.50.932 42219 129390MeasureRecord of blood pressureDM 11 (2 208 729)
5.3 (3.3-7.8)0.9 (0.0-2.3)6.01.8132 81538 9441860OutcomeBlood pressure ≤145/85
mm Hg
DM 12 (2 208 341)
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Table 1 (continued)
Median exception rate
(interquartile range) (%)% exceptedNo of exceptionsMaximum
points
available
Upper
payment
threshold
Indicator
typeDescription
Indicator (No of
eligible patients) Total
Informed
dissentTotal
Informed
dissentTotal
Informed
dissent
4.5 (2.5-7.5)1.0 (0.0-2.9)5.62.3116 23146 817390MeasureRecord of testing for
microalbuminuria
DM 13 (2 071 049)
1.8 (0.8-3.4)0.5 (0.0-1.6)2.51.254 21126 889390MeasureRecord of total cholesterolDM 16 (2 208 701)
8.0 (5.3-12.1)1.2 (0.0-3.2)9.22.5203 97854 2371750OutcomeHbA1C ≤7.5%DM 20 (2 208 047)
1.5 (0.6-2.8)0.5 (0.0-1.5)2.01.144 47223 976390MeasureRecord of estimated
glomerular filtration rate or
serum creatinine testing
DM 22 (2 208 667)
Epilepsy:
1.3 (0.0-5.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)3.81.312 4614400490MeasureRecord of seizure
frequency
EPI 6 (326 216)
1.2 (0.0-4.8)0.0 (0.0-0.0)3.61.211 7283984490MeasureDrug review involving
patient or carer, or both
EPI 7 (326 205)
12.5 (4.4-23.9)0.0 (0.0-0.0)16.12.052 6046531670OutcomeSeizure free for past 12
months
EPI 8 (326 149)
Psychotic illness:
0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)3.00.81646447190MeasureRecord of serum creatinine
and thyroid stimulating
hormone
MH 4 (55 039)
0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.0 (0.0-0.0)10.85.225011196390MeasurePatients not attending for
annual review followed-up
within 14 days
MH 7 (23 198)
10.0 (4.2-18.8)0.0 (0.0-3.6)14.13.554 35613 6682390MeasurePatient review and health
promotion advice
MH 9 (386 713)
Smoking:
0.6 (0.4-0.9)0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.70.177 19766993390MeasureRecord of smoking status
(patients with coronary
heart disease, stroke,
hypertension, diabetes,
chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, chronic
SMO 3 (11 474
188)
kidney disease, asthma,
schizophrenia, psychosis)
Stroke:
1.0 (0.0-2.5)0.0 (0.0-0.4)1.70.515 4404493290MeasureRecord of blood pressureSTR 5 (899 490)
3.7 (1.8-6.1)0.0 (0.0-0.9)4.50.840 6407021570OutcomeBlood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
STR 6 (899 399)
3.3 (1.2-6.3)0.0 (0.0-1.1)4.81.043 4588844290MeasureRecord of total cholesterolSTR 7 (899 422)
16.0 (0.0-28.6)0.0 (0.0-0.0)19.81.017 809926280MeasureReferred for further
investigation
STR 13 (90 057)
Hypothyroidism:
0.0 (0.0-0.7)0.0 (0.0-0.0)0.50.170381927690MeasureRecord of thyroid function
tests
THY 2 (1 536 123)
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Table 2| Proportion of exception reports attributable to each exception reporting category, by type of indicator
Type of indicator (%)
Reason for exception report AllIntermediate outcomeMeasurement
2.92.23.5Unknown*
40.645.935.9Logistical
7.616.20.0Clinical—contraindication
18.713.823.1Clinical—patient unsuitable
30.121.937.4Informed dissent
2 184 8111 026 0761 158 735Total No of exceptions
Based on 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were ascribable (see table 1).
*In these cases a “general” exception was applied to the patient and the exact reason for the exception report is not recorded.
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Table 3| Results of regression analysis—factors associated with exception reporting rates
Informed dissentAll exceptions
Variable 95% CIP valueCoefficient95% CIP valueCoefficient
Indicator characteristics
−0.02 to −0.02<0.001−0.02−0.10 to −0.09<0.001−0.09Upper payment threshold (per 1% increase)
−0.14 to −0.07<0.001−0.10−0.15 to 0.050.321−0.05Indicator type (intermediate outcome)
0.00 to 0.000.0450.000.11 to 0.11<0.0010.11Maximum points/remuneration available
−0.04 to −0.04<0.001−0.04−0.64 to −0.62<0.001−0.63No of eligible patients (per 100 increase in disease register size)
Practice characteristics
-0.37 to −0.29<0.001−0.33−2.44 to −2.22<0.001−2.33Maximum points scored in previous year (2007/8)*
−0.00 to 0.000.449−0.00−0.01 to −0.00<0.001−0.00% of doctors aged ≥55†
−0.00 to 0.000.054−0.00−0.00 to 0.000.2440.00% of women doctors†
−0.05 to 0.070.7850.010.06 to 0.290.0040.17Personal Medical Services contract
0.06 to 0.08<0.0010.070.26 to 0.29<0.0010.28No of patients (per 1000 increase in list size)†
Patient and area characteristics
−0.00 to 0.010.3270.000.02 to 0.04<0.0010.03% of patients aged ≥65†
−0.02 to 0.010.685−0.00−0.02 to 0.020.987−0.00% of female patients†
−0.01 to −0.00<0.001−0.01−0.01 to 0.000.197−0.00% of patients from ethnic minority groups†
0.00 to 0.00<0.0010.00−0.00 to 0.000.1780.00Population density in locality†
Material deprivation in locality‡:
——————1st fourth (most affluent)
0.02 to 0.180.0210.10−0.02 to 0.280.0820.132nd fourth
0.09 to 0.27<0.0010.180.27 to 0.60<0.0010.443rd fourth
0.23 to 0.42<0.0010.330.51 to 0.87<0.0010.694th fourth (most deprived)
Based on 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were ascribable (table 1).
*For each specific indicator.
†Data for 2006/7.
‡Measured by index of deprivation 2007.
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Figures
Fig 1 Proportion of patients exception reported by indicator and reason, 2008-9. For 37 indicators for which reasons for
exception reporting were ascribable (see table 1). Indicators ordered by type of activity (measurement or outcome) and by
rate of exception reporting attributable to informed dissent
Fig 2 Total remuneration for all practices attributable to achievement of targets and exception reporting, by clinical indicator
(all 62). Total remuneration is based on population achievement rates. Remuneration attributable to achieving targets is
based on reported achievement rates. Remuneration attributable to exception reporting is the difference between total
remuneration and remuneration attributable to achieving targets
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